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Abstract
We address least-privilege in a particular context of public cloud computing: identity-
based policies for callback functions, called Lambda functions, in serverless applications
of the Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud provider. We argue that this is an important
context in which to consider the fundamental security design principle of least-privilege,
which states that every thread of execution should possess only those privileges it needs.
We observe that poor documentation from AWS makes the task of devising least-privilege
policies difficult for developers of such applications. We then describe our experimental
approach to discovering least-privilege for a method call, and our observations, some of
which are alarming, from running it against 171 methods across five different AWS ser-
vices. We discuss also our assessment of two repositories, and two full-fledged serverless
applications, all of which are publicly available, for least-privilege, and find that the vast
majority of policies are over-privileged. We conclude with a few recommendations for
developers of Lambda functions in AWS. Our work suggests that much work is needed,
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Infrastructure- and Platform-as-a-Service public cloud computing, with which a customer
is able to deploy and run applications on the hardware and software computing resources
of a cloud provider, has become a dominant paradigm over the past decade [26]. Amazon
Web Services (AWS) [14] has been the largest provider of such services over the past few
years [58]. Along with several others, a particular cloud service that AWS provides is
serverless computing [25]; Lambda [19] is AWS’s serverless offering. A customer packages
their1 business logic as callback functions, each of which is associated with an event that
triggers its execution. A callback function in AWS Lambda is called a Lambda function.
An intent is that the customer no longer needs to explicitly specify the hardware and
software resources that should be provisioned; the cloud provider does such provisioning
“under the covers.” AWS Lambda is a dominant provider of serverless computing, and is
also the largest amongst all cloud services provided by AWS [57].
Security, and in particular, the protection of resources from unauthorized principals, is an
essential requirement in any system in which such resources are stored and manipulated.
Lambda functions in AWS are no exception. AWS perceives the security of an application
in AWS Lambda as a shared responsibility, between itself and the customer, i.e., the
owner of the application [6]: “Security . . . is a shared responsibility between AWS and the
customer. . . For AWS Lambda, AWS manages the underlying infrastructure and foundation
services, the operating system, and the application platform. [The customer is] responsible
for the security of [the customer’s] code, the storage and accessibility of sensitive data,
and identity and access management. . . to the Lambda service and within [the customer’s
Lambda] function.”
















Figure 1.1: Overview of the components and actions that are relevant to our work. Num-
bers indicate chronology. A customer of a cloud provider (1) creates and deploys a Lambda
function, an Identity and Access Management (IAM) role and an identity-based policy.
They also associate an event, a visit to a web page in this example, with invocation of
the Lambda function, and attach the identity-based policy to the role. When a user (2)
visits the web page, this (3) triggers the invocation of the Lambda function. The Lambda
function executes by first (4) assuming the role, and then perhaps (5) invoking other AWS
services.
As part of its responsibility towards security, AWS provides constructs that the customer
can use to specify their intended security policy. One such construct is an identity-based
policy [18]. An identity-based policy is attached to an identity, a role in the example in
Figure 1.1, and “controls what actions the identity can perform, on which resources, and
under what conditions” [18]. The manner in which an identity is bound to the entity is
beyond the scope of an identity-based policy. Figure 1.2 is an example of such a policy
(see Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 for more details). The policy comprises two statements,
one of which denies privileges, and the other grants privileges, as indicated by “Deny” and
“Allow,” respectively, for the Effect field. The statement at the top denies the DeleteItem
and DeleteTable privileges in the DynamoDB AWS service [7] to a resource that is listed
under Resource. The second grants GetObject in the S3 AWS service [13] to a set of
resources; “*” is a wildcard.
How it all works In Figure 1.1 we illustrate how the components we discuss above work
together. In the figure, in the first chronological step, Step (1), the customer creates and
deploys the Lambda function, an Identity and Access Management (IAM) role which the
Lambda function assumes when it runs, and an identity-based policy which the customer




"Action": [ "dynamodb:DeleteItem" ,
"dynamodb:DeleteTable" ],
"Resource": "arn:aws:dynamodb:region:accountId:table/myTable" },
{ "Effect": "Allow" ,
"Action": "s3:GetObject" ,
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::myBucket/*" }] }
Figure 1.2: An AWS identity-based policy. It comprises a set of statements, in this ex-
ample, of size two. One statement denies privileges as indicated by Deny for “Effect”
and the other grants privileges as indicated by Allow. The statement at the top denies
dynamodb:DeleteItem and dynamodb:DeleteTable to the myTable resource in the AWS
DynamoDB service [7]. The other statement grants s3:GetObject to all objects within
myBucket in the AWS S3 service [13]. The mnemonic “*” is a wildcard.
the customer associates the Lambda function with the events that trigger it—in the figure,
it is a visit to a webpage that is also created and deployed by the customer. Step (1) is the
deployment step. The subsequent steps (2)–(5) in the figure show what happens at run
time. When a user visits the webpage in Step (2), they cause the event to occur that, in
Step (3), triggers the Lambda function to run. The Lambda function, in Step (4), assumes
the IAM role that was specified for it at deployment, and, in Step (5), invokes other AWS
services as specified in its code.
Least-privilege The intent of the identity-based policy in Figure 1.1 is to ensure that
when the Lambda function runs, it has sufficiently many privileges, and no more. That is,
we seek identity-based policies that are neither under- nor over-privileged. The motivation
for preventing over-privilege is security: once an attacker compromises, for example, a
user’s account, over-privilege allows them to effect more damage than they otherwise would
have been able to [46]. The motivation for precluding under-privilege is that the reason we
create and deploy a Lambda function, in the first place, is for it to perform certain tasks.
The Lambda function cannot perform these unless it possesses sufficient privileges.
If we seek to preclude one of over- or under-privilege only, and not both, it is easy to
devise an identity-based policy. If we require preclusion of over-privilege only, we would
simply deny access to everything. If we require preclusion of under-privilege only, we would
simply allow access to everything. The balance between over- and under-privilege is the
problem of devising policies that adhere to least-privilege. As articulated by Saltzer and
Schroeder [51], least-privilege is the principle that “every program and every user of the
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system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job.” The
reason is to “limit the damage that can result from an accident or error.” Least-privilege
is customarily adopted as fundamental to good design if security is of concern.
Our motivation Apart from it being acknowledged as an important design principle,
we are motivated to investigate least-privilege in identity-based policies in AWS for two
reasons. One is the wide adoption of AWS as we mention above in this chapter, and the
fact that identity-based policies are the most widely used mechanism for managing access
in AWS applications — identity-based policies are listed first amongst all policy-types
“in order of frequency” [17]. Our other reason is two recent security incidents that have
occurred related to identity-based policies in AWS.
One is the Capital One Hack [38, 31] which led to the breach of about 100 million pieces of
private information. As CloudSploit [38] explains, “At the root of the hack lies a common
refrain: the misconfiguration of cloud infrastructure resources allowed an unauthorized user
to elevate her privileges and compromise sensitive documents.” And, “While it may be easy
to blame. . . developers for the loss of data, the truth is that IAM role misconfigurations
are likely present in nearly every single AWS account. Very few developers take the time
to carefully list each permission required; oftentimes a wildcard is used in many more
places than it should be, resulting in unintended access.” The other incident relates to an
identity-based policy that is managed by AWS, rather than the customer (we discuss the
two policy types in Section 2.3). The problem is that within the policy, a particular action
called iam:PutRolePolicy is granted, which in turn allows someone who is able to assume
the role to which the policy is attached to grant administrative access to another role [56].
This incident suggests that it is not only customers of AWS who have difficulty devising
correct least-privilege identity-based policies, but AWS themselves.
Our focus and the breadth of its applicability Our focus, as Figure 1.1 suggests,
is least-privilege in identity-based policies for Lambda functions in AWS. We have already
motivated why we consider identity-based policies in AWS above. We now first motivate
our focus on Lambda functions, and then discuss, given these foci, how broadly our work
applies.
We have two reasons that we focus on Lambda functions. One is the wide use of AWS
Lambda as we discuss earlier in this chapter — it is the most widely used service within
AWS, which, in turn, is the most widely used cloud provider. Our other reason is more
technical, and pertains to our interpretation of least-privilege. Specifically, at what gran-
ularity should least-privilege be enforced? Should it be that, for example, at any moment
in time, a thread of execution possesses a smallest set of privileges only? This somewhat
strong interpretation may be appropriate, for example, for a process in a computer operat-
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ing system. However, in cloud computing, and AWS, in particular, a more coarse-grained
interpretation seems appropriate; our focus on Lambda functions concretizes this. We make
the notion of least-privilege for a Lambda function precise in Chapter 3, and overview it
as follows.
The specification that a particular identity-based policy be bound to a Lambda function
via a role customarily happens at the time the customer deploys the Lambda function (see
Figure 1.1). Furthermore, while a Lambda function runs, it is not customary for its privi-
leges to change. Therefore, least-privilege for a Lambda function in AWS is characterized
at deployment-time, based on the method calls it makes to AWS services.
We now discuss how broadly our work applies given our focus on (i) AWS, (ii) identity-
based policies, and (iii) Lambda functions. Our focus (i), on a single cloud provider, AWS,
is, admittedly, a limitation of our work. Sufficiently detailed technical work at the level we
carry out requires customization to each cloud-provider, as each has their own approach
to a need. We observe that Google Cloud appears to have similar constructs as AWS
in this regard [41], and therefore conjecture that our work can be repeated there. Our
focus (ii) on identity-based policies can also be seen as a limitation. However, AWS has
other constructs such as resource-based policies [17] to which our observations certainly
apply. The reason is that the difference between identity- and resource-based policies is
only that the latter is bound to a resource and not an identity, but otherwise, they are
almost identical. Furthermore, as we discuss above, AWS touts identity-based policies as
the most frequently used mechanism.
Our focus (iii) on Lambda functions, as we mention above, helps us concretize the gran-
ularity at which we address least-privilege. In any context within AWS that this, or a
coarser, granularity applies, our work is relevant. This is not Lambda functions only,
but also those applications that use Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) [8], for example, for
which this granularity is appropriate. Furthermore, identity-based policies are not used for
Lambda functions only; they can be, and are, used for security by AWS applications that
use services other than AWS Lambda.
Our intent and work Underlying the work that we have done is an intent which is
expressed by the following question: if I am a developer of AWS Lambda functions and I
plan to use identity-based policies to secure them, in what manner should I configure those
policies so they are least-privilege?
Towards this intent, we have done two complementary pieces of work. In Chapter 3,
we discuss our work that, across the Java API of five different services in AWS, iden-
tifies a least-privilege identity-based policy for several methods. We then make several
observations in that chapter, including the poorness of documentation that necessitates a
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somewhat painstaking experimental process. Then, in Chapter 4, we leverage our work
from Chapter 3 to assess Lambda functions in two repositories of sample applications
[22, 55], and two serverless applications [15, 45] that have been written to run on AWS.
We ask: is an identity-based, or another similar, policy configuration made available with
the code, and if yes, is it least-privilege? The two repositories we consider host what we
can call snippets of serverless code, with the intent that someone who builds a realistic
serverless application can adopt those snippets as part of their code. The two applications
are standalone, and intended to be realistic. Thus, these are two qualitatively different
assessments. Based on our observations from Chapters 3 and 4, and towards the intent
we articulate above, in Chapter 6, we make recommendations for developers of Lambda
functions.
Terminology We use the terms “permission” and “privilege” interchangeably. Our choice
in a particular case is based on customary usage, for example, “least-privilege.” We some-
times refer to a mnemonic that may appear as an action in an identity-based policy (see
Figure 1.2) as a permission. For example, we may say, “if the role possesses the permission
s3:GetObject, then. . . ” In this case, we mean that the effect of all identity-based policies
which are attached to the role is to grant that permission to the resources in question.
Pseudonymous repository We have created a pseudonymous repository [35], to which
we refer as appropriate. The repository contains working code to illustrate three of the
several issues we discuss in this paper. A README file in the repository gives detailed
instructions on how to install and run the code within, configure identity-based policies we
provide, and what outputs to expect.
Layout Apart from Chapters 3, 4 and 6 that we discuss above, the remainder of our
paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we summarize the background on access
control, related work and the AWS security architecture. We discuss the foundations of
access control in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we discuss related work. In Section 2.3, we
overview identity-based policies and Lambda functions, and make broad observations about
the overall design of such policies and their syntax. In Chapter 5, we discuss the steps we
have taken in automating the least-privilege Identity-based policy generation process. We




In this chapter, we discuss the foundations of access control in Section 2.1, followed by a
discussion of related work and lastly, a description of the how identity-based policies fit in
the security architecture of AWS.
2.1 Access Control
In this section, we discuss the foundations of access control and security policies and
mechanisms. Content of this section is a summary of Chapters 1, 2 from the work of
Bishop [34].
Computer Security of a system is often described as maintaining confidentiality, integrity
and availability of the system. The confidentiality aspect of security deals with the con-
cealment of information or resources of a system. This means that either the unauthorized
parties are unable to use the information or resources, or they are oblivious to the ex-
istence of them. In addition to confidentiality, we are interested in answering whether
the information or a resource of a system has been improperly altered. This corresponds
to the integrity of a system. Integrity pertains to the the trustworthiness of information
or resources. Lastly, the availability of a system is its ability to use the information or
resources desired by authorized users.
Definition 2.1 (Access Control). Access Control is a process by which the use of system
resources is regulated according to a security policy and is permitted only by authorized
entities (users, programs, processes, or other systems). On a high level, a security policy
is a statement comprising of what is, and what is not, allowed [50].
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alice bob file 1 file 2
alice own read,
write
bob own read read,
write
Table 2.1: An access control matrix with two subjects alice, bob and two other objects
file 1, file 2
Access control mechanisms support confidentiality, it may conceal information to unau-
thorized parties via use of cryptography or hide the existence of information or resources
altogether. Moreover, following the principle of least privilege in access control can be
viewed as a prevention mechanism for ensuring the integrity of a system. Hence, the goal
for a security administrator, configuring access control, is to limit the access to resources
by authorized entities.
In a computer system, a state is the collection of the current values of all memory locations,
secondary storage, and all registers and other components. A subset of these states that
deal with protection is called the protection state of the system. One of the tools that
describes a protection state of the system at a given point in time is the access control
matrix. It encodes the protection state using the following entities:
• A set of all protected entities called objects, O
• A set of active objects called subjects, S
• A set of rights, R
The access control matrix A captures the relationship between the subjects and objects
using the rights that each subject has on all objects. Each entry in A is a right A[s, o] ⊆ R
that a subject s ∈ S possess over an object o ∈ O. Table 2.1 shows an example of an
access control matrix. The rows of the matrix are indexed by subjects and the columns by
objects. In the example, the entries in the matrix specify that alice can both read and
write to file 1, but has no right over bob and file 2. Similarly, bob can read file 1,
can both read and write to file 2 and has no rights over alice. Both alice and bob has
own right to themselves. The own right allows the owner of the object to add or delete
rights for themselves or grant rights to others.
In the context of AWS, a Lambda application that makes a request for an action on an
AWS resource can be thought of as a subject in the access control matrix, where the AWS
8
resources are the passive objects. The IAM permissions that a user/role associated with
a Lambda application may possess over an AWS resource are the rights available for that
particular type of resource. Although, it is difficult to use an access control matrix in
practice due to the space requirements, it is often used for theoretical analysis of security
problems.
2.2 Related Work
Our work deals with least-privilege in the context of AWS Lambda applications. The
security design principle of least-privilege, to our knowledge, was first articulated by Saltzer
and Schroeder [51]. That work discusses a number of other principles as well, which are
considered important to the design of secure systems. Apart from least-privilege, our work
is at the intersection of several topics that have been addressed in research in information
security: authorization and access control languages and systems, checking for security
properties in real-world systems, and security of cloud computing. It is well beyond our
scope to discuss each of these comprehensively. Rather, in the remainder of this chapter,
we focus on work that we see as most closely related to ours.
A piece of work that is related closely to ours is that of Felt et al. [40]. Our objectives are
similar to their work. That work exercises the Android API to determine the permissions
needed for each API method, and based on that determination, assesses several apps as to
whether they adhere to least-privilege. Thus, we are strongly similar from the standpoint
of objectives; however, the different settings, Android vs. AWS, result in different technical
details and findings. We observe that since that work, and perhaps as a consequence,
Android now provides a RequiresPermission annotation [29] so a piece of code in an app
can clearly call out the permissions it requires. One of our recommendations in this work
is exactly such a mechanism (see Chapter 6).
The other pieces of work that are related to ours are ones that assess aspects of security
in AWS. The work of Balduzzi et al. [33] identifies security risks from the use of virtual
server images from public catalogs of AWS. It identifies that some of these risks can allow
unauthorized, remote access to an AWS application. That work considers virtual server
images and AWS EC2, and not identity-based policies and Lambda functions, as ours does.
Then, there is work from AWS itself. There is work on security best practices for AWS
[2], the work of Cook [39] that discusses the use of formal methods for security within
AWS, and the work of Backes et al. [32] that discuss an automated approach to reasoning
about AWS access policies. These endeavours underlie AWS services that provide security
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assessments: AWS Config [16], Amazon Macie [12], AWS Trusted Advisor [23], Amazon
GuardDuty [10] and AWS IAM Access Analyzer [17]. None of these calls out least-privilege
as a property of interest, nor do we see mention of properties that seem to lie at the same
level of abstraction.
The discussions in the first of these, security best practices [2], is at a higher level than
least-privilege. A representative example of a recommendation there is, “Use bucket-level
or object-level permissions alongside IAM policies to protect resources from unauthorized
access and to prevent information disclosure, data integrity compromise, or deletion.” The
work of Backes et al. [32] mentions a number of properties; for example: “. . . [checks for]
AWS Lambda Functions granting unrestricted access, . . . S3 buckets granting unrestricted
read access, . . . S3 buckets granting unrestricted write access, deny putObject requests that
do not have server side encryption, and deny actions that do not allow https traffic.” These
are at a level of abstraction lower than least-privilege, in that it is possible that one or
more of these properties are needed for least-privilege in an application, but as to whether
and how, is a missing link. Furthermore, given that the mapping of an API method to
privileges does not seem to be information that is available readily, we conjecture that
that contribution of ours alone, which is in Chapter 3, may be useful to enhance these
endeavours and tools. It would be interesting to investigate also whether the expressive
power of the approaches and tools that are the current focus of such techniques within
AWS suffices for a property such as least-privilege.
Of all the AWS services we list above, the AWS IAM Access Analyser [17] seems related
most closely to our work. It is based on the work of Backes et al. [32], and it helps identify
what it calls unintended access to resources. It does so by first identifying what it calls a
zone of trust, and then checking for accesses by entities from outside this zone. While the
AWS IAM Access Analyzer can tell us whether some of our policies, particularly resource-
based policies (see Section 2.3) are least-privilege, it is unclear how one should go from a
warning issued by the analyzer to a least-privilege policy. Thus, we see the Access Analyzer
as alerting us to the possibility that our policy is not least-privilege, but not solving the
problem of devising a least-privilege policy.
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2.3 Identity-based Policies, Lambda functions, and
overall design
In this section, we first describe identity-based policies in AWS and their place in the
broader security architecture of AWS. Then, we overview Lambda functions. Finally, we
make some observations about the design of identity-based policies in AWS.
Identity-based policy Our description of identity-based policies is from the user guide
[17] and the work of Backes et al. [32]. An identity-based policy in AWS is a set of
statements, each of which is a tuple. There are three mandatory components in each
statement, and three optional components. The mandatory components are: (i) Effect:
either “allow” or “deny,” (ii) Action: a verb, and (iii) Resource: an identifier. The
optional components are a Version of the policy language, an Sid, an identifier for the
statement, and a Condition, which qualifies when this statement applies. Our work is
meaningful with the mandatory components only, and carries over easily when optional
components are included.
An identity-based policy is bound to a Lambda function via either a user or a role. The
user or role is the identity the Lambda function assumes when it runs. Then, the semantics
of a policy is the following. A policy allows an action a on a resource r by the Lambda
function if and only if there is a statement in the policy that matches a and r with the
Effect “allow,” and no statement in the policy matches a and r with the Effect “deny.”
That is, we have the customary default-deny, and deny-overrides semantics. We use the
word “matches” and not “is” because the resource r may be specified as, for example, a
wildcard, as the example in Figure 1.2 indicates for the resource ‘. . . myBucket/*’.
If more than one identity-based policy is bound to a Lambda function, then the union of the
statements in those policies applies. Also, apart from identity-based policies, AWS provides
a number of other constructs for authorization. These are the following [17]. (i) Resource-
based policies: these are identical to identity-based policies except that they are bound to a
resource rather than a principal. Correspondingly, the Resource mandatory component in
a statement is supplanted by one or more Principal components, which specify to which
principals the statement applies. (ii) Permission boundaries, Organizational service control
policies, and Session policies: with these, one can delimit the permissions that are granted.
And, (iii) Access Control Lists (ACLs): these are identical to resource-based policies, but
with a different syntax.
We focus on identity-based policies only, from the standpoint of technical details. But our
work certainly can apply almost directly to the other mechanisms we mention above. AWS
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specifies a “policy evaluation logic” [17] that expresses the manner in which these policies
co-exist from the standpoint of enforcement.
Identity-based policies are further classified into inline policies and managed policies. An
inline policy is embedded with a user or role and cannot be attached to any other user or
role. A managed policy may be attached to more than one user or role. Our work can be
seen as applying to both kinds of policies. Managed policies are further classified into two:
AWS managed policies and customer managed policies. AWS provides the former for use
by customers, but only AWS is allowed to specify and change those policies. Also, AWS
may change them at any time. A customer managed policy is specified and maintained by
the customer. A practice that AWS suggests is that a customer could first copy-and-paste
the contents of one or more AWS managed policies, and then edit it as the customer deems
appropriate, to yield a customer managed policy. One of the recent security incidents we
discuss in Chapter 1 pertains to over-privilege in an AWS managed policy [56].
Lambda functions We now discuss Lambda functions, broadly, to an extent that is
necessary and meaningful for our work. We narrow our characterization of a Lambda
function in Definition 3.1 in Chapter 3 in a manner that is appropriate for the technical
aspects of our work.
A Lambda function is a function written in a programming language such as Python or
Java. It is to be written as a callback for when an event occurs. A Lambda function
is deployed to be run by AWS Lambda. To deploy a function, one needs to create a
deployment package and an execution role. The deployment package contains the code
for the function and any dependencies such as libraries. As for the execution role, “An
AWS Lambda function’s execution role grants it permission to access AWS services and
resources. You provide this role when you [deploy] a function, and Lambda assumes the
role when your function is invoked.” [19]
Our focus is exactly the permissions that are granted to such an execution role of a Lambda
function. Identity-based policies are attached to such a role, which specify the permissions
that are granted. The policies may be either AWS or customer managed, or inline policies
(see above under “Identity-based policy”).
Figure 2.1 shows an example of a Lambda function, ListBooks for the AWS Bookstore ap-
plication that we analyze in Chapter 4. As shown in the figure, the Lambda is triggered by
an API Gateway endpoint and queries a DynamoDb table. The ListBooks lambda func-
tion takes on the execution role of newbookstore-DynamoDbLambda which grants the per-
missions to perform operations on DynamoDb, S3 and CloudWatch Logs as shown in Figure
2.2. There are three identity-based policies attached to the newbookstore-DynamoDbLambda
execution role. The first one is an inline policy with the name “PutRidePolicy”. The
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Figure 2.1: An example of a Lambda function from the AWS Bookstore application.
other two are AWS managed. We analyze these identity-based policies in detail in Chapter
4.
On the design We now make two observations on the design of identity-based policies for
Lambda functions in AWS that impacts least-privilege. One regards actions that appear
in such policies. A design choice AWS has made is for each action to be associated with
an AWS service such as S3 or EC2. For example, in the policy in Figure 1.2, the actions
begin with “dynamodb:” and “s3:”. Then, within each service, there are a number of
such actions. This design choice has led to a proliferation in the number of possible actions
that can appear in an identity-based policy. For example, in only the five services we have
examined, there are almost 600 different actions (see Table 3.1 in section 3.3).
We contrast this design choice to, for example, file permissions in UNIX. In that system,
there are three actions only: read, write, and execute. Those actions may be specified on
different filesystem objects, and the semantics of an action is a function also of the kind
of object to which it applies. For example, a read on a data file means something different
from a read on a directory. The design in AWS appears to be more like Android. At the
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"Statement": [{ "Effect": "Allow" ,
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Figure 2.2: Policy attached to the newbookstore-DynamoDbLambda execution role
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time of writing, Android has 170 system default permissions [30]. These permissions are
custom to resources, e.g., ACCESS NETWORK STATE, and in that respect, are similar
to AWS actions which are custom to a resource that is part of an AWS service, e.g.,
s3:getObject.
Apart from our observations above on the design of actions, a second observation we make
regards the binding of permissions to a thread of execution, i.e., a Lambda function. As in
Android, the binding of permissions to a Lambda function is somewhat static in AWS. One
can think of it as a deployment-time occurrence, though an identity-based policy can be
changed at later times. However, the permissions to which a Lambda function is authorized
customarily do not change as it runs. We contrast this to processes in the UNIX operating
system, which can dynamically change their privileges as they run, for example, via a call
to the setuid suite [37]. This in turn impacts our characterization of least-privilege (see
Chapter 3).
These design choices by AWS suggest that issues with least-privilege in AWS will be similar
to issues Android has suffered from the standpoint of least-privilege [40]. There certainly
are similarities as we discuss in Section 2.2 on related work. There are also some differences,
for example, in the ecosystem of an application in AWS vs. Android, that can impact least-
privilege. For example, an Android app must specify the permissions it needs in a manifest
file that is part of its “app bundle,” which is a distribution format for an app. In AWS
by contrast, there is an additional level of indirection: to deploy a Lambda function, one
needs to specify a deployment package and execution role only. Any identity-based policies





To be able to identify whether a Lambda function is least-privileged, we need to first
identify the privileges it needs. This pertains to the resources the Lambda function accesses,
which in turn, it does via AWS services. For example, if the Lambda function writes to a
storage object, it would do so via a call to a service such as S3 [13]. For our work then,
we identify whether a Lambda function is least-privileged as follows. We look at the code
for the Lambda function, and consider all the methods it invokes in AWS services and
their arguments m1(a1), . . . ,mn(an). We then perceive these methods and the sequence of
arguments of each as a set of pairs, and ask what a least-privilege set of permissions is for
that set of calls to AWS services.
Consider, for example, the snippet of JavaScript code in Figure 3.1. We omit some details,
shown as “. . .”, that do not pertain to us. We would associate that snippet of code with the
set which comprises four pairs, each of which is a method in DynamoDB and the sequence
of its arguments. We can think of the object on which a method is invoked as an argument.
If a method takes no arguments, then we can think of its sequence of arguments as being
represented by a special symbol, say ε. Of course, the arguments may be specified at run
time only, and can change each time a Lambda function runs. As we restrict ourselves
to configuring identity-based policies at deployment-time, with no changes to them at run
time, we associate a set of argument-sequences, A, with each method m that is invoked
within a Lambda function. The set A comprises every possible argument-sequence that
may be supplied to m when it is called in the Lambda function. This suggests the following
definition for a Lambda function in the context of our work. We adopt this definition for
the remainder of our work.
16
switch (...)











Figure 3.1: Example JavaScript code in a Lambda function from the AWS repository [5].
Definition 3.1 (Lambda function). A Lambda function is a set of pairs, each of the form
〈m,A〉, where m is a method in an AWS service, and A is the set of all possible sequences
of arguments that may be supplied in a call to m when this Lambda function runs.
Least-privilege set for a Lambda function Given the above characterization of a
Lambda function, we develop a characterization of a least-privilege set of permissions for
it as follows. We define, separately, a sufficient and a necessary set. Then, we define
that least-privilege means both sufficient and necessary. For sufficiency, our approach is
to first characterize it for a pair of method and argument-sequence, 〈m, a〉, then for a pair
of method and set of argument-sequences, 〈m,A〉, and then for a Lambda function, i.e., a
set of pairs, each of the form 〈m,A〉.
Definition 3.2 (Sufficient set of permissions). A set of permissions P is said to be sufficient
for a pair 〈m, a〉, where m is a method in an AWS service and a a sequence of arguments for
m, if: a call m(a) succeeds given all possible permissions implies that that call m(a) would
have succeeded given the permissions P only. A set of permissions P is said to be sufficient
for a pair 〈m,A〉, where m is a method in an AWS service and A a set of sequences of
arguments for m if, for every a ∈ A, P is sufficient for 〈m, a〉. A set of permissions P is
sufficient for a Lambda function L, i.e., a set of pairs 〈m,A〉, if P is sufficient for every
〈m,A〉 ∈ L.
The reason we have an implication with the premise “a call succeeds given all possible
permissions” in the above definition is in recognition of the fact that an instance of a call
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may fail for any number of reasons, for example, if we seek to read an object, that is
specified as an argument, that does not exist. Thus, with regards to a set of permissions
P for which we attempt to assess sufficiency, we care only about calls that succeed given
all permissions — the call fails on account of lack of privilege only.
Definition 3.3 (Necessary set of permissions). A set of permissions Q is necessary for a
Lambda function L if: there is some superset P ⊇ Q such that (i) P is sufficient for L,
and, (ii) for every q ∈ Q, P \ {q} is not sufficient for L.
We define a necessary set for a Lambda function L only. Of course L may comprise one
pair 〈m,A〉 only, and A may have one member only. Thus, we do not need, as we did for
sufficiency, to start with a characterization for a method-argument pair, 〈m, a〉.
Definition 3.4 (Least-privilege set of permissions). A least-privilege set of permissions
for a Lambda function L is a set that is necessary and sufficient for L.
We make the assumption that there are no negative permissions in AWS. This means that
for a permission p1 there is no set {p2, . . . , pk} that nullifies p1. This is different from the
allow and deny effects on a permission.
A nuance is that we do not know whether a least-privilege set in AWS is unique. Definition
3.3 for necessity above accounts for this. In the definition, we do not demand that every
q ∈ Q is a member of every sufficient set. Rather, we demand only that there exists
a sufficient set in which every q ∈ Q is indispensable. From our Definition 3.4, a set
of permissions P = {p1, p2, p3} are both necessary and sufficient if any strict subset of
the permissions in P will be insufficient. From the standpoint of non-uniqueness, we
are unsure about whether it is possible that there exists another least-privilege set of
permissions P ′ = {p4}. We should also clarify that the word Least in least-privilege does
not mean the minimum sized set but instead reflects the idea of minimal privilege in
computer security. Moreover, as we discuss in Section 3.3, most API methods only require
a single permission. Therefore, the difference between the minimum set and a minimal set
of permissions diminishes.
Constraints and choices We now identify choices we have made in our identification of
least-privilege sets, and constraints we have had to reconcile. We have implemented our
approach against the API that is part of the Java SDK for AWS. Also, we have chosen
five services whose APIs we have examined: S3 [13], DynamoDB [7], Kinesis [11], Elastic
Transcoder [9] and EC2 [8]. We have examined both version 1 [1] and version 2 [3] of the
client interface or class for each of those five services in the Java SDK for AWS. The reason
we have looked at both versions is that version 1 continues to be supported by AWS, and
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there are features supported by version 1 that are not supported by version 2 [44]. The
specific interfaces and classes we have examined are:












In the case of version 2, we instantiate a class that implements an interface using a cor-
responding builder; for example, for S3, this is s3.S3ClientBuilder, which comes with
a static builder() method. Within each of the above client classes, we have excluded
constructors, static methods, deprecated methods and any method that does not exercise
a capability of the service; for example, the shutdown() method in Elastic Transcoder that
shuts the client instance down.
We have attempted to cover seemingly different kinds of services with our five choices.
Table 3.1 shows the services, and the number of API methods in each service for which
we have identified a least-privilege set. As the table indicates, we have examined a total
of 171 API methods across the five services. A constraint we have had to circumvent is
that AWS code is closed-source and we have no access to it. Therefore, we have had to
determine a least-privilege set in a black box manner.
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3.1 The poorness of documentation
If documentation is adequate, we would not have to identify least-privilege sets experimen-
tally. Indeed, good documentation should reasonably be expected in this regard. Unfor-
tunately, we have found AWS’s documentation for necessary and sufficient permissions for
an API method to be poor. In this context, it is meaningful to compare documentation
for versions 1 and 2 of the API: between the two versions, the idiom “pick your poison” is
appropriate.
With version 1, the documentation on Java methods is largely non-existent. When there is
documentation on permissions, it regards ACLs, and not identity-based policies. There is
no clear mapping from one to the other. For example, Permission.Write may be specified
in an ACL for putObject() in S3. It is not easy to determine what the corresponding action
for an identity-based policy is. The Developer Guide for version 1 [21], under “Security
→ Identity and Access Management” redirects a reader to IAM. The IAM User Guide
[17] has an overview, and presents several examples of policies. It is unclear whether
those policies are least-privilege, and even how comprehensive they are. The examples
address specific scenarios, for example, “EC2: Start or Stop Instances Based on Tags” and
“Amazon S3: Allows Amazon Cognito Users to Access Objects in Their Bucket.” Thus,
it can be reasonably said that clear, comprehensive guidance in version 1, on permissions
for one’s Lambda function, is absent.
With version 2, the Developer Guide [20] is identical to version 1 under “Security →
Identity and Access Management.” The documentation for the Java API does mention
permissions for the S3 client [4]; but for the other four services we have examined, the
situation is the same as with version 1. However, the documentation for the S3 client [4]
in this regard is almost always incomplete, and in some cases, simply incorrect. Consider,
for example, the getObject() call. The documentation says, “You need the s3:GetObject
permission for this operation.” Unfortunately, this unqualified assertion is wrong. The
assertion should really be qualified based on a particular field in the getObjectRequest
argument. If a particular field in that argument, versionId, is set, then it turns out that
a least-privilege set for getObject() is {s3:GetObjectVersion}. That is, in this case,
s3:GetObject is not needed. If, on the other hand, the versionId field is not set, then
indeed, s3:GetObject is necessary.
We point out also incorrect documentation immediately above where it says that s3:GetObject
is needed. The line from the documentation is, “Assuming you have permission to read
object tags (permission for the s3:GetObjectVersionTagging action), the response also
returns the x-amz-tagging-count header. . . ” Unfortunately this is also not correct. The
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Figure 3.2: Documentation excerpt for the s3:GetObject method from the S3Client class
[4]
permission s3:GetObjectTagging is needed when the versionId field in the argument is
not set; s3:GetObjectVersionTagging is needed when it is set. We shows the excerpts
from the documentation for s3:GetObject in Figure 3.2.
It is interesting to compare the documentation for getObject(), and similar methods such
as getObjectAsBytes() which suffer from the same issues that we point out above, with the
documentation for deleteObject(), in version 2 of the S3Client API [4]. The documenta-
tion for deleteObject() includes the following regarding permissions. “If you want to block
users or accounts from removing or deleting objects from your bucket, you must deny them
the s3:DeleteObject, s3:DeleteObjectVersion, and s3:PutLifeCycleConfiguration
actions.” The excerpt is shown in Figure 3.3. This passage must be parsed somewhat
carefully—it is a negation of a conjunction. It turns out that the passage is indeed
correct—if one wants to ensure that an object cannot be deleted, all of those permis-
sions must be denied. Thus, the documentation for deleteObject() appears to observe,
correctly, that s3:DeleteObjectVersion may cause an invocation of deleteObject() to
succeed. The documentation for getObject(), on the other hand, does not observe that
s3:GetObjectVersion may enable a successful invocation of getObject().
There is a risk also, as we mention above, that example policies that have been published
by AWS are not least-privilege. We discuss an example in our observations on EC2 in the
next section: the policy in the user guide for VM import/export [27] is over-privileged.
From the standpoint of incompleteness, we observe that the documentation in version 2
of S3’s API for getObject(), and related methods such as getObjectAsBytes(), says only
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Figure 3.3: Documentation excerpt for the s3:DeleteObject method from the S3Client
class [4]
that s3:GetObject is “needed,” i.e., necessary. It does not say what is sufficient. Thus,
in version 2 we have, in most cases for API methods, completely missing information on
permissions. In cases that information is present, it is often incorrect and incomplete.
Our pseudonymous repository [35] includes code for the two issues above: S3’s getObjectAsBytes()
and EC2’s VM export.
3.2 Our approach to identifying permissions for an
API call
In this section, we discuss the manner in which we have identified a least-privilege set of
permissions for a single call, i.e., method-arguments pair, for a service in AWS. In Chapter
4, we then leverage Definition 3.4 to identify a least-privilege set for a Lambda function
and apply it to our study of serverless applications.
Our approach works as follows. For each method m in an AWS service, we have devised
a method, called SetupEnvAndArgs(), which takes as argument the method m, and sets
up an environment in AWS, and arranges a sequence of arguments a such that a call
m(a) is guaranteed to succeed if the caller is given all possible permissions. This is not
easily automated because a particular environment is typically appropriate for one service
only, and within that service, only for a small set of API methods. Furthermore, a least-
privilege set may change based on the arguments to the method call. Thus, we have a
collection of such environments in our set up. We abstract all of them into the single call
SetupEnvAndArgs() for clarity of exposition. It takes as input the method m and returns
a sequence of arguments for m.
Also, we have devised a method, call it Failure(), which takes two arguments: an AWS
method m, argument-sequence a for it, and a set of permissions P , and returns true if and
only if the call m(a) fails given that the caller possesses the permissions P . Otherwise, i.e.,
if the call succeeds, it returns false. Thus, a property that expresses the manner in which
the above two methods are composed is the following. If we invoke SetupEnvAndArgs(m)
22
and it returns a, and then we invoke Failure(m, a, P ), the latter call returns false if and
only if the call m(a) is successful given the environment set up by the former call, and the
caller has the permissions P .
We now discuss two algorithms we have devised and run against the AWS API to identify
a least-privilege set. Both algorithms take two inputs: a method m to an AWS service,
and a set of permissions S. Each algorithm premises that the input S is sufficient (see
Definition 3.2). It is easy to identify such a sufficient set; the set of all possible permissions
in AWS is sufficient. Each algorithm then identifies a necessary set that is a subset of
that sufficient set S. The result is a necessary and sufficient, i.e., least-privilege, set. Our
first algorithm, LPLinear below, performs a linear-search through the members of S and
identifies whether each is necessary.
LP Linear(m,S)
a← SetupEnvAndArgs(m)
if Failure(m, a, S) then return error
Result← ∅
foreach p ∈ S do
a← SetupEnvAndArgs(m)
if Failure(m, a, S \ {p}) then
Result← Result ∪ {p}
return Result
LP Linear is correct: it is guaranteed to terminate, and if the input set of permissions S is
sufficient for 〈m, a〉, then the Result that LP Linear returns is least-privilege for 〈m, a〉.
The time-efficiency of LP Linear is a function of two things: (i) the size of S, and, (ii) how
long SetupEnvAndArgs(m) and Failure(m, a, S) take to run. Assuming the duration (ii)
is not a function of S, there is nothing we can do to mitigate that time. We can mitigate
(i) in two ways. One is that we can start with as small a set S as possible. This involves
making a good guess for a sufficient set that is small; for example, much smaller than













Figure 3.4: An example run of LP Binary on copyObject() in S3. A green box is a sufficient
set of permissions. A red box is a set that is not sufficient. The set with only the two
permissions, s3:GetObject and s3:PutObject is least-privilege.
LP Binary, which attempts a binary search.
LP Binary(m,S)
S1 ← half the members of S
S2 ← S \ S1
a← SetupEnvAndArgs(m)
if Failure(m, a, S1) then
a← SetupEnvAndArgs(m)
if Failure(m, a, S2) then
return LP Linear(m,S)
else return LP Binary(m,S2)
else return LP Binary(m,S1)
LP Binary invokes not only SetupEnvAndArgs and Failure as subroutines, but also LP Li-
near. The reason is that LP Binary partitions S into two sets, call them S1, S2 and invokes
LP Binary recursively in the hope that at least one of them is a sufficient set. Now assume,
as an example, S = {p1, p2, p3, p4}, S1 = {p1, p2} , S2 = {p3, p4}, and the only least-privilege
set for 〈m, a〉 that S contains is {p1, p3}. Thus, the call Failure(m, a, S) returns false, but
both Failure(m, a, S1) and Failure(m, a, S2) return true. In LP Binary, we fall back to
LP Linear starting at S if this happens. In the worst-case, LP Binary is no more time-
efficient than LP Linear; in practice, it improved our time-efficiency considerably. Figure
3.4 shows an example run of LP Binary.
The process is painstaking and time-consuming for two reasons. The subroutine SetupEnv-
AndArgs() is difficult to fully automate. Also, the process is different for different sets of
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API calls. One of the drawbacks of a manual approach for generating arguments for
invoking a method is incompleteness. Here, incompleteness refers to the fact that it is
infeasible to test a method with all the possible valid inputs, which can be potentially
infinite, using our manual approach. We mean that the argument space for an argument
of type T is all the values that T can have. For example, testing all possible int values in
Java will require a tester to test 232 possibilities. We discuss an approach to address this
issue in Chapter 5.
The subroutine Failure() can take several seconds, or even minutes, to return, as it is
made remotely to AWS. As an example, exploring all the nodes we show in Figure 3.4 took
around 10 minutes using our set up. Our experience further emphasizes the need for good
documentation so developers do not have to use our methodology.
As a possible future exploration, one option is to invesigate the QuickXPlain algorithm
proposed by Ulrich Junker, which provides a divide-and-conquer computation strategy to
find within a given universe an irreducible subset with a particular (monotone) property.
Our problem of finding least-privilege set of permissions can also be seen as finding an
irreducible set. In fact, LP Binary utilizes the divide-and-conquer strategy [49].
3.3 Observations
Before we assess whether policies that have been published alongside AWS serverless ap-
plications are least-privilege in Chapter 4, in this section, we make observations about
per-API method least-privilege sets we have identified by running the algorithms from the
previous section. We first present some quantitative data and inferences we make from
it. Then, for each of the five services, we make qualitative observations. For each method
m, only in some cases is a least-privilege set also a function of arguments to m. In this
section, when we report quantitative observations, we report per-method only. We reserve
discussions related to different least-privilege sets for different arguments to a method for
qualitative discussions, as we do in Section 3.1 on documentation on S3’s getObject()
method.
Table 3.1 lists, in order, (i) the five AWS services we have examined, (ii) the number of
methods of each service’s Java API for which we have identified a least-privilege set, and the
total number of methods in that service, (iii) the number of API methods for each service
whose least-privilege set size is more than one, (iv) the total number of permissions that
are associated with each service, (v) the number of API methods from the total number
























S3 56 176 1 92 143 74
DynamoDb 31 63 0 48 3 10
Kinesis 41 41 2 26 2 0
Elastic
Transcoder
18 18 3 17 0 1
EC2 25 458 2 393 10 0
Table 3.1: Quantitative observations from our identification of least-privilege sets of per-
missions per API method. These numbers are for version 1 of the Java API to AWS. The
numbers for version 2 differ only slightly.
number of permissions associated with each service which have no API method of the same
name. The reason we report (v) and (vi) is our conjecture that if the names are the same,
a developer will be able to easily guess which permission is needed for the methods their
Lambda function invokes, notwithstanding poor documentation.
Towards rationalizing why we have chosen to call out the data in Table 3.1, we recall our
intent from Chapter 1: we seek to make it easy for a developer to identify a least-privilege
set of permissions so they can then write out a least-privilege identity-based policy for
their Lambda function. From the data in Table 3.1 and qualitative observations we have
made which are discussed after we discuss the quantitative data, we make the following two
conjectures on design intent in AWS. One, given the rather large number of permissions—
576 across the five services in Table 3.1, and the large number of API methods whose
least-privilege set is exactly one permission—is that a design intent is for an API method
to be associated with its own unique permission. A second conjecture, based on the large
number of permission names being exactly that of an API method, is that an exact match
between a permission name and an API method name is a design intent.
With these conjectured design intents in mind, we take another look at the data in the
table. We argue that the fact that these design intents are not adhered to strictly is a
problem; that is, the third column, “Least-privilege set size > 1” is non-zero for four of
the five services, for the API methods we have examined. Also problematic is the lack of
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universality on whether an API method is associated with a permission of the same name.
On this aspect, we observe in Table 3.1, that S3 is the worst-offender, with 143 of the 176
methods not being associated with a permission of the same name. For the other services,
most methods are associated with a permission of the same name, but not universally so,
except for Elastic Transcoder.
When we say “is a problem” in the last paragraph, we mean from the standpoint of a
developer who attempts to devise a least-privilege identity-based policy. If indeed both
design intents we articulate above are adhered to strictly, then it would be easy for a
developer to write down a least-privilege set not only for a single method, but their entire
Lambda function.
A reason why we have shown both the last two columns in Table 3.1, is that it is unclear,
given an API method, whether it is easier to identify a least-privilege set starting with that
API method, or alternately, starting with the set of all permissions, and then attempting
to identify which of those may be associated with our API method of interest. For Elastic
Transcoder, it appears that it is easier to identify a least-privilege set starting with the
API method; for Kinesis and EC2, starting with the set of all permissions may be easier.
We now make per-service, qualitative observations, while still consulting the data in Table
3.1.
S3: As Table 3.1 shows, S3 is the “worst-offender” from the standpoint of mismatch
between API method names and permission names. Notwithstanding the fact that all but
one of the 56 API methods for which we identified least-privilege sets is of size one, only
16 of the 56 have a permission that is the same as the method name. An example of a
method that requires a single permission only, in version 1 of the API, is setBucketAcl().
The only permission in its least-privilege set is s3:PutBucketAcl. We call this example
out particularly because we notice that in version 2 of the API, the name of the method
has been changed to putBucketAcl(), i.e., to match that of the permission. This supports
our conjecture above regarding a design intent for APIs in AWS: an API method name
should match that of a permission.
The only API method in S3 amongst the ones for which we identified least-privilege sets
that requires more than one permission is copyObject(), which copies one object, call it the
source object, to another, call it the destination. We observe that the documentation for
copyObject() in version 2 includes some discussions about permissions which are entirely
missing in version 1. However, these discussions for version 2 are for setting up permissions
in an ACL for the destination object; they have nothing to do whatsoever with permissions
to invoke copyObject().
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DynamoDB DynamoDB performs very well from the standpoint that each API method
we examined has a least-privilege set of size one only, and only three of all the API methods
in DynamoDB are associated with no permission of the same name. However, given that
we have 48 total permissions only, and given the number of permissions that have no API
method of the same name—10 in the last column of Table 3.1, there are a few amongst
the 63− 31 = 32 methods that require more than one permission.
Kinesis As Table 3.1 indicates, we identified least-privilege sets for the entirety of the
Kinesis API. We found only two methods with least-privilege sets of size greater than
one. For these two, we made an additional interesting, and perhaps alarming, observation.
The two methods are startStreamEncryption() and stopStreamEncryption(). For each
of these, the policy in Figure 3.5 is sufficient. We observe that that policy grants every
permission whose prefix is kinesis: to every resource. However, when we replace this
policy with the policy shown in Figure 3.6, the method call fails, thereby suggesting that
the policy in Figure 3.6 is under-privileged. The two policies should be equivalent—in
the policy in Figure 3.5, we have used a wildcard, and in the policy in Figure 3.6, we
have enumerated all the permissions in Kinesis. This suggests that there is some hidden
permission in Kinesis which is granted in the former case only. Consequently, we are unable
to devise a policy that is guaranteed to be necessary.
In Figure 3.7, we show a more restrictive policy than the one in Figure 3.5, but still sufficient
for the startStreamEncryption() and stopStreamEncryption() calls in Kinesis. This
policy is more complex, and difficult to devise. There is still no guarantee that it is least-





"Resource": "*" } }
Figure 3.5: A sufficient policy for startStreamEncryption() and stopStreamEncrypt-
ion() APIs for AWS Kinesis.
{ "Statement": {
"Effect": "Allow" ,
"Action": [ "kinesis:AddTagsToStream" ,
...
"kinesis:UpdateShardCount" ],
"Resource": "*" } }
Figure 3.6: A policy for startStreamEncryption() and stopStreamEncryption() in
Kinesis that is under-privileged, but should not be, given that the policy in Figure 3.5
is sufficient. We use “. . .” to indicate that we enumerate every possible permission with
prefix “kinesis:”.
{ "Statement": [{ "Effect": "Allow" ,








{ "Effect": "Allow" ,
"Action": "kinesis:*" ,
"Resource": [ "arn:aws:kinesis:*:*:stream/*" ,
"arn:aws:kinesis:*:*:*/*/consumer/*:*" ]},
{ "Effect": "Deny" ,




















"Resource": [ "arn:aws:kinesis:*:*:stream/*" ,
"arn:aws:kinesis:*:*:*/*/consumer/*:*" ]},
{ "Effect": "Deny" ,








Figure 3.7: A more restrictive policy for startStreamEncryption() and
stopStreamEncryption() in Kinesis than Figure 3.5, that is sufficient, but not nec-
essarily with least-privilege.
Elastic Transcoder As Table 3.1 shows, we have identified a least-privilege set for every
method in Elastic Transcoder’s version 1 Java API. Indeed, one of the reasons we chose
that service is its relatively small sized API, which gave us the ability to exhaustively
examine it. It may seem counter-intuitive that every one of the 18 methods has a least-
privilege set of size one, but that we have 17 permissions only. The reason for this is that
two of the methods are overloaded, and one permission is associated with a deprecated
method. Thus, we have 16 unique method names, and 16 unique permission names that
match exactly.
Another observation about Elastic Transcoder’s API relates to the three methods that
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require more than one permission. These are: createPipeline(), updatePipeline() and
createJob(). Of these, we discuss the first two in particular. For these calls to succeed, the
instance of the AWS Elastic Transcoder service that the cloud application utilizes, itself
needs to be authorized in particular ways to effect actions that underlie these methods.
This, in turn, can be done using an identity-based policy that is attached to whatever role
is assumed by the instance of AWS Elastic Transcoder1. For this, createPipeline() and
updatePipeline() require iam:passRole which “. . . allows the service to later assume the
role and perform actions on [the application’s] behalf” [17]. We omit more details here, and
emphasize only that it is not necessarily straightforward to identify least-privilege policies
for these methods, because, in addition to a policy for the role the invoker of the method
assumes, we need to devise a least-privilege policy for the role the instance of the AWS
service, in this instance Elastic Trancoder, assumes.
EC2 23 of the 25 API methods for which we identified least-privilege sets in EC2 have
size one only, and each such permission has the same name as the API method. For
the remaining two, however, things are more complex. The two are importImage() and
exportImage(), and the situation with them is similar to the methods createPipeline()
and updatePipeline() for Elastic Transcoder that we discuss above. That is, each needs
to authorize the EC2 service with a number of permissions. We show the least-privilege
policies for the role that the EC2 service assumes in Figures 3.9 and 3.10. In this context,
we caution that the policy in the user guide [27] is over-privileged on account of use of
wildcards, and inclusion of permissions that are not necessary. The policy presented in the
EC2 user guide is shown in Figure 3.8. We also include the code that demonstrates this
issue in our pseudonymous repository [35].
1AWS calls such a role a service role. A separate trust policy must be specified to authorize the instance







{ "Effect": "Allow" ,
"Action": [ "s3:CreateBucket" ,"s3:DeleteBucket" ,
"s3:DeleteObject" ,"s3:GetBucketLocation" ,
"s3:GetObject" ,"s3:ListBucket" ,"s3:PutObject" ],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::mys3bucket" ,"arn:aws:s3:::mys3bucket/*" ]},























Figure 3.8: Policy given in the EC2 User Guide [27] for the role assumed by the instance
of EC2 for importImage, exportImage API methods.
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{ "Statement": [{ "Effect": "Allow" ,
"Action": [ "s3:GetObject" ,
"s3:GetBucketLocation" ],
"Resource": [ "arn:aws:s3:::test-bucket" ,
"arn:aws:s3:::test-bucket/
image-to-import" ]},
{ "Effect": "Allow" ,




Figure 3.9: A least-privilege identity-based policy for the role assumed by the instance of
EC2 for importImage. Note that this is different from the least-privilege policy for the
role assumed by the Lambda function that invokes importImage().
{ "Statement": [{ "Effect": "Allow" ,
"Action": [ "s3:PutObject" ,
"s3:GetBucketAcl" ],
"Resource": [ "arn:aws:s3:::test-bucket" ,
"arn:aws:s3:::test-bucket/
image-exports/export-file" ]},
{ "Effect": "Allow" ,
"Action": "ec2:DescribeImages" ,
"Resource": "*" }]}
Figure 3.10: A least-privilege identity-based policy for the role assumed by the instance of
EC2 for exportImage(). Note that this is different from the least-privilege policy for the
role assumed by the Lambda function that invokes exportImage().
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3.4 Summary
Poor documentation is a major problem. Ideally, documentation would be adequate so
one does not have to identify what permissions are associated with an API method exper-
imentally as we have had to do. We have observed that AWS documentation is largely
missing, and in cases that it exists, it is often incorrect and incomplete. Our experimental
assessment has led to some interesting observations on the per-API method least-privilege
sets. Some of our observations are alarming, for example, our observations in Kinesis that
leads us to conjecture that there is a permission that is not public. In the next chapter, we
leverage our identification of least-privilege sets of permissions to assess whether policies




We have analyzed two publicly available sets of policies for AWS serverless applications as
to whether they adhere to least-privilege. Our identification of least-privilege sets against
which we compare the published policies are from the approach we discuss in the previous
chapter. In Section 4.1 we discuss our study of two repositories, each of which contains sev-
eral serverless applications. These applications appear to be snippets of code, presumably
with the intent that a developer of a large application can adopt or adapt these snippets
as part of their application. In Section 4.2, we look at two complete demo serverless ap-
plications, each of which contains several Lambda functions. Both these applications have
identity-based policies that have been published alongside; we analyze those policies for
least-privilege.
4.1 Two Repositories
In this section, we discuss least-privilege in the context of serverless applications that have
been made available publicly by (i) AWS [22], and, (ii) a company called Serverless, Inc.
[55]. Table 4.1 presents our quantitative observations for the two repositories. We now
discuss each, in turn.
AWS repository This is a repository from AWS that has been made available for de-
velopers to adopt and adapt in their own applications. We have analyzed the Lambda
functions that have been written in Javascript in that repository, and the policies that
have been published for each. In the AWS repository, customer managed policies are pub-
lished as so-called policy templates, which allow for placeholder values for resources. The
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AWS 56 54 3 6
Serverless 68 21 0 8
Table 4.1: Data on two publicly available repositories.
intent is that those placeholder values are to appear in any adaptation of a developer of
the code for the policy to have the intended effect. The only difference between a customer
managed policy and a policy template is that AWS publishes the available policy templates
[24]. This detail does not impact whether the policy is least-privilege or not.
As Table 4.1 indicates, there are 56 demo applications in the repository which are written
in Javascript, which we have looked at. Of these, 54 have policies published alongside.
Of these 54, three are AWS managed and the remainder are customer managed, i.e., pol-
icy templates. We find that only six of the 54 adhere to least-privilege. None of these is
amongst the ones that are AWS managed. None of the six that are least-privilege has more
than one permission; that is, they are amongst the easiest to devise. An example of over-
privilege from the repository is for the Microservice HTTP Endpoint application [5]. As
the template.yaml file there indicates, it adopts the DynamoDBCrudPolicy that is part of
the policy templates published by AWS [24]. Unfortunately, for the application, that pol-
icy is over-privileged. The application needs the dynamodb:DeleteItem, dynamodb:Scan,
dynamodb:UpdateItem and dynamoDB:PutItem permissions only (see Figure 3.1 in Chapter
3). DynamoDBCrudPolicy grants a number of additional, redundant permissions.
Thus, if a developer adopts not only the code, but also the policies from the AWS repository,
they are likely to end up with over-privileged applications. If they adopt the code only
and not the policies, then they have the additional task of devising policies.
Serverless, Inc. repository The intent of this repository seems to be the same as the
one from AWS; for developers to be able to adopt and adapt in their own applications. The
repository contains a total of 68 applications for AWS. We looked at all 68 applications;
Table 4.1 presents our data. As the table indicates, only 21 of the 68 applications have
a policy published alongside. This is reasonable: only those 21 applications make calls
to AWS services. The others are written so they can be deployed in AWS Lambda, but
either have code-logic only, or invoke non-AWS services only, such as an http request to a
non-AWS service to find the current time. It is interesting to observe, as the table reports,
that none of those 21 policies is AWS managed. Notwithstanding, we find only eight of
the 21 to be least-privilege.
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Overall, both least-privilege and over-privileged instances in this repository are less straight-
forward than the ones in the AWS repository. For example, policies with more than one
permission are amongst those that are least-privilege; for example, an application that
needs two permissions on the same resource [54]; thus, the policy, correctly, places both
actions in the same statement of the policy. Amongst the policies that are over-privileged,
we have some whose cause is the use of wildcards [52]. We also have policies with a few
redundant permissions, for example, one that grants six permissions, when only five are
needed [53]; the redundant permission in that case is dynamodb:Query.
4.2 Two Applications
Apart from the two repositories we discuss in the previous section that contain several
applications, we have looked also at two applications for which identity-based policies have
been published alongside, which we discuss in this section. Unlike the applications in
the repositories, the two applications we discuss in this section are more full-fledged. They
contain several Lambda functions each. The applications in the repositories in the previous
section can be seen more as snippets. The two applications we have looked at are one for
a Bookstore [15] and the other for a retail outlet [45]. We now discuss each, in turn.
The Bookstore application The Bookstore application [15] emulates Amazon’s cus-
tomer website, with functionality such as those to search books, add to carts, and view
orders. The application has a total of nine Lambda functions. The policy that has been
published with it, unfortunately, is grossly over-privileged. The root cause for this appears
to be that the same role is assumed by all Lambda functions when they run. The pol-
icy that is attached grants all permissions across all those Lambda functions to the role,
thereby resulting in over-privilege. A more careful design would be for each Lambda func-
tion whose least-privilege set is distinct to be associated with a role of its own. This design
choice can be seen as separation of concerns in software engineering and the advantage
is modularity of the application. With separate roles for every lambda, in an event of a
security breach the affected lambdas in an application are limited. In large applications
with many lambda functions, the execution role sharing many permissions across multiple
lambda functions can be hard to manage. The downside is that every time a change is
made to a lambda function, the identity-based policy attached to the execution role of the
lambda may need to be changed as well. This is an additional burden on the developer.
Worse, still, even if we consider the union of method calls made across all the Lambda
functions in the application, the policy is over-privileged. For example, it grants s3:Get*
and s3:List* actions, i.e., every permission that begins with “s3:Get” and “s3:List,”
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{ "Statement": [{ "Effect": "Allow" ,
"Action": [ "s3:Get*" ,
"s3:List*" ],
"Resource": "*" },
{ "Effect": "Allow" ,












{ "Effect": "Allow" ,




Figure 4.1: The over-privileged policy that has been published with the Bookstore appli-
cation [15]. The same role is assumed by all the Lambda functions in the application, and
therefore, this same policy is attached to all of them when they run.
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{ "Statement": [{ "Effect": "Allow" ,





{ "Effect": "Allow" ,




Figure 4.2: A least-privilege policy for the listBooks lambda function in the bookstore
application.
which is redundant. Indeed, none of the nine Lambda functions exercises S3; therefore any
permission in S3 that is awarded is redundant. Permissions on DynamoDB are excessive as
well. In Appendix 4.1, we reproduce the policy that has been published for the application.
We then constructed least-privilege policies using our approach in Chapter 3 for two of the
Lambda functions that are part of the application, listBooks and addToCart. Figure
4.2 shows the least-privilege policy for listBooks lambda function and Figure 4.3 shows
the least-privilege policy for addToCart lambda function. Included in these least-privilege
policies are permissions for calls for logging that are made implicitly, and are not explicit in
the code for those Lambda functions. The logging permissions are implicit because AWS
Lambda automatically reports metrics to AWS Cloudwatch. To discover the implicit per-
missions, the only way that we are aware of is to read the AWS Lambda documentation on
setting up logging. Without those permissions, the Lambda functions will run successfully;
however, logging will not be performed.
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{ "Statement": [{ "Effect": "Allow" ,
"Action": "dynamodb:PutItem" ,
"Resource": "arn:aws:dynamodb:region:accountId:table/Cart" },
{ "Effect": "Allow" ,




Figure 4.3: A least-privilege policy for the addToCart lambda function in the bookstore
application.
{ "Statement": [{ "Effect": "Allow" ,






Figure 4.4: Policy in Hello, Retail! for Lambda functions that are triggered by AWS
Kinesis events. The Visual Editor [36] reports a warning for this policy, as we discuss in
the prose.
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The Hello, Retail! application Hello, Retail! is an application for a retail store [45]. It
has won a serverless architecture award [43]. The application is built for the scenario that
a merchant adds a product to their store. Once a product is added to the store, a photo-
grapher takes a photograph of the product, followed by prospective customers of the store
being able to see the product and its photograph. Hello, Retail! realizes its functionality
by producing and consuming events anytime a photographer is registered, a new product
is added by the merchant, and a photo for the product is taken by a photographer.
We analyzed 13 of the Lambda functions of Hello, Retail! We found only a somewhat
subtle problem with over-privilege as we discuss below. We found also what appear to be
under-privileged policies, which we discuss further below as well. Every policy in Hello,
Retail! that we examined appears to be “hand-crafted” carefully, and not, for example,
blindly copied from other sources. This may explain at least partly why the policies appear
to be of the highest quality amongst all the ones we encountered in the course of carrying
out our work for this thesis. It would certainly be interesting to analyze the entirety of
Hello, Retail!; to do so, we would need to greatly expand the scope of AWS API methods
for which we have identified least-privilege sets.
Before we discuss the instances of over- and under-privilege, we observe a good design
choice in Hello, Retail!, unlike in the Bookstore application we discuss above: each Lambda
function assumes a distinct role when it runs. The only instance of over-privilege we found
regards a grant of kinesis:DescribeStream and kinesis:ListStreams to a particular
Lambda function. On further investigation, the problem seems to be one of design in AWS,
rather than a misconfiguration on the part of Hello, Retail!.
There are two issues here; we present the problematic policy in Figure 4.4. One issue
is that the kinesis:DescribeStream and kinesis:ListStreams permissions are needed
only when a Lambda function is registered to be the callback when a Kinesis event happens.
Those permissions are not needed subsequently; in particular, they are not needed when
the Lambda function is invoked and runs in response to an event. We have confirmed this
by removing those permissions once the Lambda function is registered as the callback; we
observe that the Lambda function is indeed invoked successfully. However, such a change
to a policy is not a customary operation: as we say in Chapter 3, customarily, a policy is
specified and attached to a role at deployment-time.
The other issue is that kinesis:ListStreams is not a permission that is to be bound to
any particular resource, i.e., instance of a stream. Rather, it is a permission that applies to
any stream. When the policy in Figure 4.4 is entered into the Visual Editor of AWS [36],
it gives a warning, “The actions in your policy do not support resource-level permissions
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{ "Statement": [{ "Effect": "Allow" ,





{ "Effect": "Allow" ,
"Action": "kinesis:ListStreams" ,
"Resource": "*" }] }
Figure 4.5: Modified version of the policy from Figure 4.4.
and require you to choose all resources.” In Figure 4.5 we present a modified policy for
which there is no warning; it grants kinesis:ListStreams to *. With either policy, the
Lambda function works as expected. This suggests that the VisualEditor quietly grants
kinesis:ListStreams to all resources, which would be undesirable.
We mention the two instances of under-privilege that we have discovered in Hello, Re-
tail!. One regards logging: it appears that Hello, Retail! does not configure the required
logs:CreateLogStream permission, and therefore, logging fails. The other instance of
under-privilege we found regards the decrypt() call to the AWS Key Mananagement Ser-
vice. This requires the kms:Decrypt permission; however, the role the Lambda function
that invokes decrypt() assumes is not configured with a policy that grants that permission.
Nevertheless, the application fails gracefully.
4.3 Summary
We have found that the vast majority of identity-based policies that have been published
for AWS serverless applications suffer from over-privilege. Therefore, we caution AWS
serverless application developers from blindly adopting those policies in their applications.
Doing so can expose their applications to security compromises. One possibility is an
insider attack. Here, an employee uses an application, with over-privileges assigned to it,
to perform his daily activities. If one day he decides that he is soon going to leave the
company, he can use the over-privilege application to cause havoc to company resources.
Sometimes employees may cause damages to company resources unknowingly. In this
case, the employee is a user of the application. In fact, any user using an over-privilege
application is a possible threat to security of resources.
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Chapter 5
Steps towards automated policy
generation
5.1 Argument Partitioning
As we discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the least privileged identity based policy for an API is
dependent on the API method and arguments for the method. We also encountered cases
where different arguments to an AWS API method required different permissions. For the
same method, there exist more arguments which may require a new set of permissions.
We mentioned the problem of invoking a method with all possible valid inputs using our
manual approach in Chapter 3. The problem can be addressed if we can partition the
argument space and only consider a representative argument from each partition in the
argument space. Moreover, we are only interested in arguments that do not make the
program go into an error state. This is assuming that the execution role of the API has
full access, making sure that error is not due to lack of a privilege.
Definition 5.1. A partition of a set S is a collection of nonempty disjoint subsets of S
whose union is S.
Let S be the set of all the possible arguments that can be passed into an API method.
The partition of S provides a way to decompose the S into disjoint subsets based on some
equivalence relation or characteristic. The advantage is that there is no need to test all
possible arguments, one from each partition is sufficient.
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This problem often comes up in testing of software as input space partitioning and the
way to partition the input space is called input domain modelling. There are two main ap-
proaches to input domain modelling: Interface-based input domain modelling and Functionality-
based input domain modelling.
In the interface-based approach each parameter is considered in isolation and ignores the
dependencies of a parameter on other parameter. The strength of this approach is that it is
easy to identify characteristics which are needed for partitioning. Since each characteristic
limits itself to a single parameter, it is easy to come up with test cases as well. One of the
weakness of this approach is that not all the information available to the test engineer will
be reflected in the interface domain model. This raises the possibility of the model being
incomplete. Another weakness is that due to the lack of considering dependencies between
parameters, important sub-combinations may get missed [28].
In functional-based approach, the goal is to identify characteristics based on the function-
ality of the system rather than the interface. This allows the tester to incorporate some
semantics or domain knowledge into the input domain modelling. Unlike the interface-
based approach the dependencies among parameters are considered. The strength of this
approach is that it is more goal-oriented but the down side is that it requires more design
and thought [28].
In functional-based approach, characteristics can be derived from any of the following:
preconditions, postconditions, the program specification, design information or the pro-
gram. Ostrand and Balcer et al. [47] talk about a systematic specification based method,
called category-partition, for generating arguments necessary for functional tests. Other
approaches include boundary-value analysis and classification trees method, which is a
refinement over the category-partition method. These are possible choices that we may
explore in the future. Grindal et al. [42] did a thorough survey of such techniques.
Category-Partition method helps a tester devise what inputs and environment conditions
to consider for testing that may affect the behaviour of a method. A tester begins with
identifying categories of information that characterize each input and environment condi-
tion. A category is a major property of an input or environment condition. Each category
can be further partitioned into distinct choices that include all possible values for a par-
ticular category. The choices are the partition classes from which a representative element
is taken for testing a method.
We use the Category-Partition approach to come up with various categories and choices
of parameters and environment conditions to invoke an AWS API method. This helps
us tackle the problem of incompleteness regarding arguments. Figure 5.1 shows an ex-






is less than 3 characters long [error]
is more than 63 characters long [error]
is between 3 and 63 characters long [property length_valid]
bucket name:
is null [error]
is not a unique string [error]
contains an uppercase character [error]
begins with 'xn-' [error]
in IP address format [error]
is unique and 'valid' [if length_valid]
[property bucket_name_valid]
acl:
is empty [if bucket_name_valid]
is an arbitrary string [error]
is UNKNOWN_TO_SDK_VERSION [error]
is PRIVATE [if bucket_name_valid]
is AUTHENTICATED_READ [if bucket_name_valid]
is PUBLIC_READ [if bucket_name_valid]
is PUBLIC_READ_WRITE [if bucket_name_valid]
is object lock enabled:
is False [if bucket_name_valid]
is True [if bucket_name_valid]
grant full control:
is empty [if bucket_name_valid]
is an arbitrary string [error]





is empty [if bucket_name_valid]
is an arbitrary string [error]




is empty [if bucket_name_valid]
is an arbitrary string [error]




is empty [if bucket_name_valid]
is an arbitrary string [error]




is empty [if bucket_name_valid]
is an arbitrary string [error]




is AF_SOUTH_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is AP_EAST_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is AP_NORTHEAST_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is AP_NORTHEAST_2 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is AP_NORTHEAST_3 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is AP_SOUTH_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is AP_SOUTHEAST_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is AP_SOUTHEAST_2 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is CA_CENTRAL_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
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is CN_NORTH_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is CN_NORTHWEST_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is EU [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is EU_CENTRAL_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is EU_NORTH_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is EU_SOUTH_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is EU_WEST_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is EU_WEST_2 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is EU_WEST_3 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is ME_SOUTH_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is SA_EAST_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is UNKNOWN_TO_SDK_VERSION [error]
is US_EAST_2 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is US_GOV_EAST_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is US_GOV_WEST_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is US_WEST_1 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
is US_WEST_2 [if bucket_name_valid] [single]
Environment:
bucket with the specified name exists [error]
bucket with the specified name does not exist [if bucket_name_valid]
Figure 5.1: Shows the categories and choices when the Category-Partition method applied
to s3.createBucket(CreateBucketRequest). A valid user id, email address or uri is
one that has an associated AWS account with it. A random email address of the form
emailAddress=”myrandomemail@gmail.com” is invalid and results in error.
In the unrestricted version of the method, one without [error] and [single] annotations,
there would be 4245696 possibilities of test cases we will need to generate for testing one
value from each choice of a category. Luckily, by reading the specification we can identify
choices that will result in errors and we can label them as such. Using the [error]
annotation, we can reduce the number of tests needed to 8017. We got 8017 by not
counting the combination of [error] choices with any choice from other categories.
We were interested in knowing whether there are choices that do not contribute to a change
in permissions needed for an invocation of s3.createBucket(CreateBucketRequest). In
our testing, we started with a CreateBucketRequest object with a valid bucket name
and tested values from the choices in the bucket location constraint category. The bucket
location constraint describes the region the S3 bucket will be created in. We noticed that
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the location constraint did not require additional permissions. Therefore, one test case for
each choice in this category is sufficient. We use the [single] annotation, as introduced
in the original paper, to describe the special and redundant condition that do not need
to combined with all possible choices from other categories. With the introduction of
the [single] annotation, we can further reduce the number of tests to 320. This is a
significant decrease from the the number of tests in the unrestricted case. The number of
tests needed are still too large to be generated manually. For scaling this process to many
more APIs across various AWS services, there is a need for a way to generate these tests
programmatically.
In the next section, we describe the use of a unit test generator to generate tests program-
matically.
5.2 Test Case Generation
In the previous section, we discussed a way to partition the arguments and pick a repre-
sentative argument from each class of arguments. We used the Category-Partition method
to help us devise a strategy to pick the representative arguments. Due to the combina-
torial nature of the method, the test cases are large to be constructed manually. We are
interested in knowing whether the test cases can be constructed programmatically instead.
We consider Randoop as a plausible choice for test-case generation. Pacheco et al. [48]
introduced a Feedback-directed random test generation techique. Randoop is an imple-
mentation of this technique to randomly generate tests by incorporating feedback obtained
from executing test inputs as they are created. It takes in the JAR of the program that we
wish to generate the tests for, in our case AWS SDK. The technique builds a sequence of
method calls starting from an empty set. Each method call in the sequence contains the
method name and the arguments it takes, which can be Strings, primitive values or refer-
ence values returned by previous method calls. The technique randomly selects a method
call to add to a sequence and finds arguments from among previously-constructed methods
in the sequence. Once the method is added to the sequence, it is executed and checked
against a set of contracts and filters. Randoop stops generating the tests after a time limit
has passed. The time limit can be configured by the time-limit option.
When the testclass option is set, Randoop considers user-specified argument values dur-
ing the test-case generation. The user can further annotate primitive fields within this
Java test class using @TestValue. An example of a test class is shown in Figure 5.2.
48
public class TestValues {
private static final String EXECUTE_ROLE_ARN =
"arn:aws:iam::accountId:role/execute-role" ;
@TestValue
public static String bucketName = "test-bucket" ;









public static CreateBucketRequest createBucketRequest(String bucket) {
return CreateBucketRequest.builder().bucket(bucket).build();
}
private static AwsSessionCredentials getAwsSessionCreds(String roleArn) {
StsClient sts = StsClient.builder().region(Region.US_EAST_1).build();











Figure 5.2: A test class that can be set in the testclass option. The bucket name is
annotated with the @TestValue which will now be considered by Randoop as an input to
a method call during the test generation process. The public methods in the class are
considered as methods that return reference values for an AWS API method.
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In addition to the methods in the test class, a list of methods from the AWS SDK can be
given as an input to Randoop using the methodlist option. This list describes the methods
that Randoop should consider when generating the tests. For the AWS API method,
s3.createBucket(CreateBucketRequest), we discovered that s3:CreateBucket is not
the only permission needed for all valid arguments. There are arguments that require 2







is a valid user id, email or uri
(format: id="", emailAddress="", uri="")
grant read ACP:
is a valid user id, email or uri
(format: id="", emailAddress="", uri="")
grant write:
is a valid user id, email or uri
(format: id="", emailAddress="", uri="")
grant write ACP:
is a valid user id, email or uri
(format: id="", emailAddress="", uri="")






Figure 5.4: s3:createBucket, s3:PutBucketObjectLockConfiguration permissions are
needed for the choices of arguments shown.
5.3 Summary
We recognize the limitations of generating least-privilege policies manually. The main
drawback is incompleteness of arguments in our manual approach of testing privileges. We
use the Category-Partition method, introduced by Ostrand and Balceret al. [47] to parti-
tion the argument space. We claim that one representative argument from each partition is
sufficient for coverage of the argument space. We use a random test generation tool, Ran-
doop, based on feedback-directed technique and developed by Pacheco et al. [48]. With
Randoop, we are able to generate tests for s3.createBucket(CreateBucketRequest) API




We recall from Chapter 1 that our goal is to help developers with devising least-privilege
policies for their serverless applications. Often security is perceived as an afterthought in
software development process in many teams. The approach mentioned in this thesis is
an effort to incorporate in the development process at a minimal time investment. In an
ideal world, coming up with the permissions needed for a lambda function would be easy
but in our experience it is not always the case. An iterative process can be used instead.
This can be seen in the same light as why software testing is an important step in the
software development life cycle. We encourage the developers to make an active effort to
look for various AWS APIs invoked in every lambda function in an application and using
our approach to come up with the least-privilege policies during the development process.
This incorporation of security in the development process improves the security stature of
the application early on, makes developers aware of security of their application and saves
them time that would have been instead spent on ensuring security of the application later
in the development process. Often times, improving on the over-privileged policies can be
taxing and require many iterations.
We now make a few recommendations based on our work and consequent observations.
Recommendations for developers using AWS:
• Do not blindly adopt published policies Published policies appear overwhelm-
ingly to be over-privileged. This includes policies in AWS user guides. A developer
should carefully examine a policy, and edit it, before adopting it for their application.
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• Identify least-privilege sets for API methods It is easy to cull any AWS
API method calls one makes in one’s Lambda functions. To us, a first step any
developer should take before configuring an identity-based policy is to identify, for
each such method and their anticipated arguments, what a least-privilege set of
permissions is. This process can be painstaking as documentation may be non-
existent or faulty. However, it is worthwhile if one cares about security. Then, using
our definition in Chapter 3, the developer of an application can identify least-privilege
sets of permissions.
• Provision distinct roles It is necessary to provision a distinct role for each set of
API methods. That is, suppose an application has several Lambda functions. Now
suppose we perceive a Lambda function as defined in Chapter 3, i.e., as a set of
pairs of API methods and arguments that are anticipated for those methods. We
first partition our Lambda functions based on whether their sets are identical. This
determines the number of different roles we need—one per partition.
Recommendations for both AWS and developers using AWS :
• Be wary when using AWS managed policies AWS managed policies “are
designed to provide permissions for many common use cases.” [17] However, as
one may expect, AWS cannot possibly anticipate every possible use case. Hence, it
behooves the adopter of an AWS managed policy to carefully look through it, and
ensure that the policy indeed meets the adopter’s needs. Furthermore, the User Guide
warns, “AWS occasionally updates the permissions defined in an AWS managed
policy. When AWS does this, the update affects all principal entities (users, groups,
and roles) that the policy is attached to.” Thus, such a change could be effected
unbeknownst to the adopter. The safest option, in our view, is to not adopt AWS
managed policies at all if one cares about security. They can be used, for example,
as a starting point for a customer managed policy. But that is the extent of their
utility, in our view.
• Anticipate bugs in code and documentation Based on our observation on
documentation (see Section 3.1), and on Kinesis, in which we conjecture that there
is a hidden permission (see under “Kinesis” in Section 3.3), we caution developers
that, like other complex pieces of software, the authorization components of AWS,





We have addressed least-privilege identity-based policies for Lambda functions in AWS. We
have motivated our focus on each of identity-based policies, Lambda functions and AWS,
and pointed out that devising such policies is not easy. A problem is poor documentation,
which necessitates a somewhat painstaking experimental process for determining what a
least-privilege set of permissions is for a method and arguments for that method. We
have identified least privilege sets for 171 methods across five different AWS services and
made observations about them from the standpoint of how easy it is for a developer to
devise least-privilege policies. Some of our observations are alarming: for example, on
being unable to guarantee a least-privilege policy for two methods in AWS Kinesis. We
have studied also two repositories of Lambda functions, and two sample applications, all
publicly available, and found that over-privilege is pervasive in them. We have concluded
with a few recommendations for developers of serverless applications in AWS.
There is tremendous scope for future work. It would be invaluable for developers of server-
less applications to have a tool to automatically generate least-privilege policy for their
applications. Another key insight with the progress made in Chapter 5 is to observe what
different set of permissions are needed for a method and arguments based on the argu-
ment partitioning. In addition, an interesting piece of work would be to examine other
cloud providers in the same manner as we do in this work. Even within AWS itself, it is
interesting to examine AWS managed policies, and ask how well designed they are. This
would require a semantic understanding of the intent of each of those policies, which in
itself can be challenging. Finally, there is the question of whether an alternative design for
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